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3
ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACROSS THE NATION

WUL G

I.

WE
QT0W

Go Q&ja
RWE
1HcNc

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a sophomore in a small high school in
Oklahoma. 5 You are an honor student and a member of the Show
1. Walter Shapiro, Student PrivacyJust a Specimen for Profit, Politics, USA TODAY,
July 27, 2002, at 4A.
2. 122 5. Ct. 2559 (2002).
3. The author would like to thank Charlotte Noel Fox for her editing, grammar,
and active voice skills.

4. Christopher Z. Campbell, Use of School Resource Officers, Address at the

North Carolina Council of School Attorneys Summer Law Conference (July 26, 2002).
5. Brief for Respondents at 4, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 5. Ct. 2559 (2002) (No.
01-332).
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Choir, marching band, Academic Team and the National Honor Society.6 Pretty distinguished, right? Now imagine you are sitting in class
and there's a knock on the door. The principal's assistant walks into
your class, in front of your classmates and your teacher, and
announces that you are to report to the school's gym immediately for
your drug test. 7 Horrified? Embarrassed? Appalled?

Let's add to your humiliation. As you go into a stall in the bathroom of the gym to submit your urine sample in a plastic vial, three
faculty members, all of whom you know, listen outside the stall to
make sure you do not "cheat."" When you come out of the stall, you
hand your urine sample to one of the faculty members and then watch
as the faculty member holds the vial to the light and checks the temperature. 9 Do you feel violated? Lindsay Earls did. In fact, she felt so
violated she filed suit. 10
The process Lindsay endured was part of the Tecumseh
Oklahoma School District Student Activities Drug Policy adopted in
1998 in order to deter drug use among its students.'1 The Policy was a
method of last resort. In the past, other programs the school implemented did not reduce drug use by students. 1 2 Drug use was an obvious problem in the school district; teachers observed students who
appeared to be high and the community was well aware of the
problem.

13

The implemented Policy works as follows: students are required to

consent to and take a drug test before participating in a competitive
activity. 1 4 The student also agrees to be tested randomly while participating in the activity, or at any time when there is reasonable suspicion the student may be using drugs. 5 The first time a student tests
positive for drugs, a meeting is held with the student, the student's
parent or parents, the athletic director and the principal.' 6 The student may continue to participate in the competitive activity if she
agrees to attend drug counseling and take another drug test within two
6. Respondents' Brief at 4, Earls (No. 01-332).
7. Respondents' Brief at 5, Earls (No. 01-332).
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Earls ex rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
11. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2562.
12. Petitioners' Brief at 4, Earls (No. 01-332).
13. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567. The School Board president testified that people in
the community were calling the board to discuss the "drug situation."
14. Id. at 2563.
15. Id.

16. Petitioners' Brief at 8, Earls (No. 01-332).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/2
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weeks. 1 7 If a student tests positive a second time within the school
year, she may not participate in competitive activities for fourteen
days.' 8 By agreeing to complete four hours of drug counseling and
random tests for the remainder of the year, the student may be reinstated after the fourteen day suspension has expired. 19 A student who
tests positive for the third time is banned from all competitive activities
for the remainder of the school year or the remainder of the semester of
the school year, whichever is longer.20
No disciplinary or academic sanctions are imposed for a positive
drug test. 2 ' The process is kept confidential.2 2 Moreover, within the
Policy is an appeals process to the Superintendent, which allows the
student to continue competing until the appeal is heard.2 3
Lindsay Earls believed extracurricular activities were vital to her
acceptance into a competitive university. 24 She also knew there was
only one way to protect her privacy-not participate in extracurricular
activities. 25 However, not participating was not a viable option for
Lindsay because she knew non-participation would put her in danger
26
of not being accepted at Dartmouth, her college of choice.
In response to the Policy and her growing concerns, Lindsay and
another student, Daniel James, who wanted to participate on the Academic Team, brought an action against the school district under 42
U.S.C. §1983 alleging the Policy of random drug testing violated their
Fourth Amendment right to privacy as incorporated to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 7 In September 2001, following a grant of
summary judgment for the school district in district court and a reversal of the district court's decision by the Tenth Circuit, 28 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. It was Lindsay Earls' fresh17. Id.
18. Id. at 9.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9.

24. Respondents' Brief at 6, Earls (No. 01-332).
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 6. See also Dartmouth's "First Year Admissions," available at http://
www.dartmouth.edu/-admissns/admissions/index.html. Various factors are
considered for admission into Dartmouth varying from academics to family values to a
sense of humor. "Significant" participation in extracurricular activities ranging from
community service and debate to athletics and drama are also considered.
27. Earls ex rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (W.D.Okla. 2000).
28. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
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man year at Dartmouth.2 9 Unfortunately, Lindsay's plight to protect
her and her fellow students' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures was dashed by the United States
Supreme Court.3" The Court's decision serves as a warning to all students who attend our nation's public schools: the next step is random
drug testing for all.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES IN THE SCHOOL CONTEXT:

"SPECIAL NEEDS"

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees citizens' privacy will not be unreasonably interfered with by providing: "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated...-31 The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
to guarantee the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by the government.3 2
Not all searches and seizures by the government are unconstitutional. 33 The cornerstone of search and seizure review by the government is reasonableness. 3 4 Reasonableness in a criminal context
requires a warrant or probable cause. 3 5 However, there are several situations where neither warrants nor probable cause are required, but the
search is still considered reasonable.3 6 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the
United States Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment guarantee to searches and seizures conducted by school officials. 37 However, the Court also determined that such searches and seizures by
school officials do not need to be supported by a warrant or probable
29. ABCNews.com, Broader Drug Testing in Schools Approved (June 27, 2002), at
http://printerfriendly.abcnews.com/printerfriendly/Print?fetchFromGLUE=true&

GLUEService.
30. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
31. U.S. CONST. amends. IV.
32. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2564.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). A student's purse was searched
by the principal based on the belief the student possessed cigarettes. The search
revealed the student was in possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. In a motion to
suppress the evidence in her purse at her delinquency adjudication, the student
argued the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures.
37. Id. at 336-37.
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cause 38 because special needs exist in public schools. The court
explained warrant or probable cause requirements would "unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures [that are] needed" in schools.3 9 Pursuant to this line of
reasoning, individualized suspicion may not be necessary in order to
conduct school drug testing, due to the fact that "the reasonableness
inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children."4 °
III.

VERNONIA: THE REASONABLENESS TEST POSITED

The first case to challenge the constitutionality of suspicionless
drug testing in school was Vernonia School District47J v. Acton. 4 ' The
Vernonia school board enacted a random, suspicionless drug testing
policy for athletes in response to a rampant drug culture in the
schools, after it was discovered the athletes were the ring leaders.4 2 The
drug problem had caused increased disciplinary problems in the
school, 4 3 and the involvement of athletes troubled administrators from
44
a safety standpoint.
The Court's decision heavily favored the school system, keeping
close to the notion that schools are responsible for the children they
teach.4 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority stated, "[clentral, in our
view... is the fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who
(2) have been committed to the temporary custody of the state as
schoolmaster. ' 46 In order to balance students' interests with the "spe38. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). The Court
reasoned that extending the warrant and probable cause requirements to schools
would undermine the great need for administrators and teachers to maintain order in
schools.
39. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
40. Id.
41. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
42. Id. at 649-50.
43. Id. at 649. The number of disciplinary referral in the Vernonia schools rose
more than twice the number reported ten years earlier and several students were
suspended. Students had also become extremely rude and profane in class.
44. Id. Drug use was believed to have been the cause of several misexecutions and
various omissions of safety procedures, one of which resulted in a serious sternum
injury.
45. Id. In a 6-4 decision, the majority decision was written by Justice Scalia in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer
joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented, in
which Justice Stevens and Souter joined.
46. Id. at 654
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cial needs" of the school system, the Court expounded a reasonableness balancing test.4 7
The first factor to be considered is the nature of the privacy interest intruded upon by the search. 48 The privacy interests intruded
upon must be interests society recognizes as legitimate. 49 The second
factor to be balanced is the character of the intrusion. 50 This factor
inquires into the process of the drug test itself and the ramifications of
the test on the student. 51 The third factor considers the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern along with the efficacy of the
means chosen to meet that concern.52
In considering the nature of the student's privacy interest, the
Supreme Court recognized a student athlete's privacy interest is less
than that of a student who does not participate in athletics.53 Athletes
who choose to go out for the team are subjected to greater regulation
than the average "Joe" who simply attends school. 54 Moreover, inherent in athletics is the tradition of "communal undress '55 where students must shower and dress together with no partitions between
them.56 In
the words of Justice Scalia, "[s]chool sports are not for the
57
bashful.

In the Court's eyes, the degree of intrusion to which the drug testing subjected athletes was "negligible," and therefore, insignificant. 58
The collecting of urine samples was performed under normal conditions.59 Moreover, since the drug test only screened the urine for illicit
drugs and because the entire process was confidential, the intrusion
was not enough to tip the Supreme Court's balancing scales in favor of
the students.6 °
Finally, in considering the nature and immediacy of the concern,
the Supreme Court emphasized the high rate of drug use among the
47. Id. at 664.
48. Id. at 654.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 660.
53. Id. at 658.
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 657.
58. Id.
59. Id. Normal conditions were described as conditions comparable to a public
restroom experience.
60. Id. at 660.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/2
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nation's school children and the school's interest in curbing and deterring drug use. 6 ' The policy met those concerns head-on according to
the Court because the targeted students-the athletes-led the drug
culture in the school.6 2
The Vernonia case relied upon a very well-developed fact pattern.
It demonstrated the existence of a very specific drug problem among a
very narrow group-athletes.6 3 In making its decision the Supreme
Court held fast to those facts, stressing that the decision applied only
to student athletes.6 4 However, the Vernonia decision quickly became
the cornerstone for expanding school board policy throughout the
nation. 65
A.

The Vernonia Progeny: School Boards Extend Vernonia to
ExtracurricularActivities

Since the Vernonia decision, school districts throughout the
nation have relied on the Supreme Court's balancing factors to
develop and support drug testing programs, not just for student athletes but for students involved in other extracurricular activities as
well. 66 Because the decision in Vernonia only applied to student athletes, it was unclear whether the decision extended to students who
participated in non-athletic extracurricular activities.6 7 Thus, courts
have reached different conclusions when faced with the issue of
whether suspicionless drug testing violates the privacy of a student
who participates in extracurricular activities. 6 8 Inherent in subse61. Id. at 661. The Court noted that school years are the time when the
psychological, physical and addictive effects of drug use are most severe. The Court

also noted that the effects of drugs filter into the school system, disrupting the
educational process and disturbing the school's function of being responsible for
children.
62. Id.
63. Letter from Richard A. Schwartz, Attorney, Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., to
Susan McHugh, Superintendent, Polk County Schools 2 (February 11, 2002) (on file
with author).
64. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646.
65. Letter from Richard A. Schwarz, Attorney, Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., to Susan
McHugh, Superintendent, Polk County Schools 2 (February 11, 2002) (on file with
author).
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. See Neal H. Hutchens, Comment, Suspicionless Drug Testing: The Tuition for
Attending Public School?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1265 (2002); Letter from Richard A.

Schwartz, Attorney, Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., to Susan McHugh, Superintendent,
Polk County Schools 2 (February 11, 2002) (on file with author); Tamara A. Dugan,
Note, Putting the Glee Club to the Test: Reconsidering Mandatory Suspicionless Drug
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quent courts' differing conclusions is the uncertainty about amount of
emphasis each of the factors expounded by the Vernonia Court should
receive.
B.

Student Privacy and Evidence of a Drug Problem: Balancing the
Scales

Because the fact pattern in Vernonia was so specific and the drug
threat so immediate, courts dealing with the constitutionality of drug
testing policies applied to students who participate in non-athletic
extracurricular activities had very different ideas on the weight to be
given to each factor . Must the school demonstrate an immediate, viable drug threat before they can constitutionally implement a random,
suspicionless drug testing policy, or do statistics that show an increasing drug problem in our schools generally suffice the compelling interest for the school district? Does a student's voluntary participation in
an activity that does not entail any communal dressing or intimate situation automatically lessen the student's expectation of privacy? Does
the fact the student is held to higher standards of regulation lessen the
student's expectation of privacy to the level of an athlete?
In decisions upholding drug testing policies, both the Seventh and
the Eighth Circuit agreed that students who participate in extracurricular activities enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy than those students
who do not participate.6 9 Both courts stressed the voluntary nature of
competitive non-athletic extracurricular activities and the fact that stuTesting of Students Participatingin ExtracurricularActivities, 28 J. LEGIS. 147 (2002).
Courts holding suspicionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities does
not violate students' Fourth Amendment right to unreasonable searches and seizures
include the Seventh Circuit, see Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052
(7th Cir. 1999); see Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998); the
Eighth Circuit, see Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999) vacated as moot, 172
F.3d 582 (June 15, 1999). Courts finding suspicionless drug testing of students who
participate in extracurricular activities unconstitutional include the Supreme Court of
Colorado, see Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998); the
Federal District Court in the Northern District of Texas; see Tannahill v. Lockney
Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001); and the Tenth Circuit, see Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
69. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063. The Seventh Circuit concluded that there were three
tiers of privacy interest. Students who do not participate in any type of
extracurricular activity enjoy the greatest amount of privacy while students who
participate in athletics enjoy the least amount of privacy. Students who participate in
extracurricular activities other than athletics fall in the middle of the spectrum. See
also Miller, 172 F.3d at 579, where the Eighth Circuit stated because students who
participate in extracurricular activities subject themselves to higher regulation than
other students, they have a lesser expectation of privacy.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/2
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dents who do participate in extracurricular activities hold themselves
out to stricter rules and regulations.7 °
On the other side of the coin, the Supreme Court of Colorado and
the Northern District of Texas found student drug testing policies to be
unconstitutional, concluding students who participate in athletics
have a lesser expectation of privacy than all other students.7 The
Northern District of Texas asserted the only distinction needed to be
made for drug testing policies was the distinction between those students who participate in athletics and those who do not. 7 2 The com-

munal dress and public showering aspects of athletics tips the privacy
scales in favor or students who do not participate in athletics, including those students who participate in other competitive extracurricular
activities. 73 Along the same rationale, the Supreme Court of Colorado
in Trinidad also concluded that students who participate in athletics
have a lesser expectation of privacy than other students stating, "one
74
could hardly argue that the marching band is 'not for the bashful."'
The immediacy of the school's interest also played a role in these
courts' decisions. Since the drug problem in Vernonia was demonstrable and of epidemic proportions,75 courts struggled with the issue of
how evident the drug problem in the school had to be before the
school could take action. 76 The lack of a demonstrable, immediate
drug epidemic led the Northern District of Texas in Tannahill to conclude that the school district failed to demonstrate a compelling state
interest. 77 However, the Eighth Circuit in Miller placed its emphasis
on the substance abuse problem in public school and the need to
maintain order in the classroom to justify the school district's interest
to enact a drug policy. 78 The court stated, "[w]e see no reason that a
school district should be compelled to wait until there is a demonstrable problem with substance abuse among its own students before the
70. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063; Miller, 172 F.3d at 579.
71. Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1107; Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
72. Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
73. Id.
74. Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1107
75. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
76. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000); see
Miller ex rel. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, 172 F.3d
582 (June 15, 1999); see Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo.
1998); see Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex.
2001).
77. Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 929-30. There was no evidence the drug problem
in Lockney schools neared the proportions of the drug epidemic in Vernonia.
78. Miller, 172 F.3d at 579-80.
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district is constitutionally permitted to take measures that will help
protect its schools ....

IV.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT FINDS RANDOM, SUSPICIONLEss DRUG
TESTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Tenth Circuit, reiterated the three-factor test outlined in
Vernonia, but in applying the test disagreed with fellow circuits that
had found similar policies constitutional; therefore the court reversed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school
district and found the Policy unconstitutional.8 s0 The Tenth Circuit's
decision rested on "balancing of the students' privacy interests against
the District's interest in testing students pursuant to the policy."8' 1
The Tenth Circuit first considered the nature of the privacy interest. 2 The school district argued students who participate in extracurricular activities have a lesser expectation of privacy for three reasons:
(1) they voluntarily participate; (2) they occasionally travel out of
town on trips where they must sleep together, dress together and use
communal bathrooms; and (3) they hold themselves out to higher regulations both by the district and the Oklahoma Secondary Schools
Activities Association (OSSAA).8 3 Judge Anderson, writing for the
majority, quickly dismissed the second contention, stating it was
doubtful that the Supreme Court wanted so much emphasis placed
84
upon the communal undress of sports in its opinion in Vernonia.
Much more important to the Tenth Circuit was that students who
take part in extracurricular activities voluntarily choose to participate
and in doing so, choose to subject themselves to regulations.8 5 Judge
Anderson made it clear, voluntary participation in an activity alone
does not reduce a student's expectation of privacy, but agreeing "to
follow the directives and adhere to the rules set out by the coach or
other director of the activity" does reduce the student's expectation of
79. Id. at 581.
80. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001). The court stated,
"In reaching this result, we realize that we are disagreeing with two of our fellow
circuits. However, there are other courts with which we are in agreement. This issue is
obviously a difficult one with which courts will continue to grapple."
81. Id. at 1275.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id. The court declined to give this argument too much weight, saying, "[wle
doubt that the Court intends that the level of privacy expectation depends upon the
degree to which particular students.. dress or shower together or, on occasion, share
sleeping or bathroom facilities while on occasional out-of-town trips."
85. Id. at 1275-76.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/2
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privacy. 6 Therefore, "like athletes, participants in other extracurricular activities have a somewhat lesser privacy expectation than other
students. ' 7
Like most previous courts, the Tenth Circuit compared the character of the intrusion of the testing with the testing in Vernonia, and
found the process of collecting urine samples on the students' privacy
"not significant.""" At first, it looked as if the Tenth Circuit was leaning
toward the same decision as reached in Vernonia, at least in regards to
the first and second factors of the balancing test. Then, in considering
the third factor, the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of the means for meeting that concern, the court
decided, "[t]his factor tips the balancing analysis decidedly in favor of
the plaintiffs."'

9

According to the court, the special needs concern was not met. 9°
Safety reasons could not be the sole factor for the Policy because it is
both underinclusive and overinclusive. 9 ' The Tenth Circuit found it
hard to imagine how drug use could be a safety factor in extracurricular activities such as vocal choir and academic teams. At the same
time, the Policy did not include testing of those students who engaged
in activities that posed a safety risk such as shop class or experiments
in laboratories.

92

Secondly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the District's argument that
students are subject to less supervision than stuextracurricular
all
dents in classrooms.9 3 The court again noted this could not be the
sole justification for the Policy, since students who are not in extracurricular activities are not monitored constantly.9 4 Judge Anderson concluded, "neither a concern for safety nor a concern about the degree of
stusupervision provides a sufficient reason for testing the particular
95
Policy."
the
under
test
to
chose
dents whom the District
86. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276. The court noted that mere participation in an
extracurricular activity is integral to the "complete educational experience" of the
student and does not reduce the student's expectation of privacy. However, the court
also noted that by subjecting themselves to high regulations of a coach or other
directive, the students constrain their personal freedom at least some of the time.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1277.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit analyzed the nature of the District's concern
and the immediacy of the drug problem in the district. 96 "given the
paucity of evidence of an actual drug abuse problem among those subject to the Policy, the immediacy of the District's concern is greatly
diminished."9 7 In the court's eyes, the District did not demonstrate an
actual drug abuse problem. 98 Therefore, the testing of students who
participate in extracurricular activities would not redress the drug
problem in Tecumseh schools. 9 9 In sum, in order to protect against
Fourth Amendment violations, "any district seeking to impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to participation
in a school activity must demonstrate that there is some identifiable
drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the
testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its
drug problem."1 °°
In the dissent, Judge Ebel questioned the majority's line of reasoning in using the Vernonia balancing test. 1 ' In his opinion, the drug
abuse problem needed to rise to the level of a crisis in order to implement a drug testing policy 10 2 and the decision to adopt a drug testing
policy should be left up to the local boards of education. 10 3 Additionally, Judge Ebel accused the majority of placing too much weight on
the students' privacy interest and not enough on the state's interests. 10 4 Judge Ebel reasoned the majority's emphasis on the immediacy of a demonstrable drug problem imposes additional special needs

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court compared the demonstration of the drug problem in Vernonia
with the problem here. The court found it hard to allow a drug testing policy where
there was no real demonstrable drug problem.
99. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278. The court found this to be a significant factor in its
decision stating that, "Unless a district is required to demonstrate such a [drug]
problem, there is no limit on what students a school may randomly and without

suspicion test."
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1283.
102. Id. at 1284.
103. Id. at 1285. Judge Ebel writes: "I would therefore defer to the judgment of the
local school boards, which are far better positioned (and more accountable) then
federal judges to decide the type of drug testing policy that will best serve their need to
protect children entrusted in their care."
104. Id. at 1283. Judge Ebel elaborated, "[t]he majority appears to forget its earlier
conclusion that there is just not much for the school district's interests to be weighed
against."
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requirements within the school context.10 5 According to Judge Ebel,
this requirement "mandates a more detailed demonstration than was
ever required... in Vernonia. ' 106 He suggested using an analysis that

does not rest on special needs and goes directly into the Vernonia bal10 7
ancing test.
V.

CHANDLER V. MILLER:

08

How

MUCH IS ENOUGH SPECIAL NEEDS?

Chandlergave the Supreme Court a chance to rule on the scope of
suspicionless drug testing from another viewpoint. The Supreme
Court invalidated a Georgia law requiring all individuals seeking statewide political office to submit to and pass a drug test.'0 9 Since the
drug testing was essentially a search, the law had to be justified under
a "special needs" exception or meet the Fourth Amendment requirement that searches must be based on individualized suspicion."
The Supreme Court held suspicionless drug testing of political
candidates to be unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment as
it did "not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches.""' Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion noted the special needs of the state must be important enough
to override the individual's privacy interest in order to "suppress the
Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion.""' 2 Applying this need to the facts in Chandler, the Court found
that even though the drug testing policy was noninvasive, the State
failed to produce any evidence of a drug use problem among politi105. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1281. "Notwithstanding the majority's statement that no
special need for random, suspicionless drug testing must be demonstrated by the
school district in this case, the majority appears to reimpose a special needs
requirement toward the end of its opinion."
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1280-81. Judge Ebel relied on the decision in Miller, 172 F.3d at 578,
which stated, "[tihe Supreme Court has held that the public school environment
provides the requisite 'special needs' so that a school district may dispense with those
Fourth Amendment protections [of probable cause and warrants issued by a neutral
magistrate]."
108. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
109. Id. at 309.
110. Id. at 314.
111. Id. at 309.
112. Id. at 314. The court must undertake a "context-specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties" in order to
meet the "special needs" doctrine.
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office, unlike the case of the stucians or candidates for state political
113

dent population in Vernonia.
From the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler, it seemed the
Tenth Circuit was correct in their decision-that in order to invoke the
special needs exception, there must be evidence of a drug abuse
problem.
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT ANSWERS THE EXTRACURRICULAR QUESTION

After the Tenth Circuit's decision created a split among the circuits and the Supreme Court's ruling in Chandler, the question of the
constitutionality of random, suspicionless drug testing was left hanging in the balance. It was unclear where the Supreme Court of the
United States would stand on this issue when it granted certiorari in
2001."1 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the Tenth
Circuit holding the Policy constitutional.115
Writing for the majority, 1 6 Justice Thomas held, "[t]his Policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and
preventing drug use among its students.""' 7
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court applied the threefactor balancing test of Vernonia to the "somewhat different facts of
this case."" 8 In evaluating the nature of the privacy interest intruded
upon, the Supreme Court maintained a line of reasoning much like
that of the Vernonia court, emphasizing the fact that the issue arises in
the school context and it cannot be forgotten that schools have custo113. Id. at 319. The proof of unlawful drug use "bolsters" the argument of the state
that drug testing programs are warranted and appropriate. The Court stated, "[a]
demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity of
a testing regime, would shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless
general search program."
114. See Brad Colwell and T.C. (Chris) Mattocks, Random Urinalysis Drug Testing of
Non-Athletic ExtracurricularParticipants: Application of Vernonia Earls v. Board of
Education of Tecumseh Public School District, 43 SCH. LAW REP. 67, 69 (2001); See Neal
H. Hutchens, Comment, Suspicionless Drug Testing: The Tuition for Attending Public
School?, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1265, 1276 (2002); See Letter from Richard A. Schwartz,
Attorney, Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., to Gary K. Laney, Superintendent, McDowell
County Schools 4 (April 29, 2002) (on file with author).
115. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
116. Charles Lane, Drug Tests Backed for Broader Pool of Students: Justices Approve
Monitoring of Participants in All Extracurricular Activities, Not Just Athletics, THE
WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 2002, at A01. The majority was comprised of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Thomas.
117. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2562.
118. Id. at 2565. The Court acknowledged the fact that Vernonia was decided on a
very specific fact-balancing analysis.
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dial responsibility for its students which weighs heavily in the schools'
favor. " 9
When determining the nature of the privacy interest intruded
upon, the Court focused on the voluntary aspect of extracurricular
activities. Students who participate in extracurricular activities do
subject themselves to greater regulations by the OSSAA as well as the
rules dictated by the particular club, which do not apply to the student
body as a whole.1 2 ° Therefore, students who participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities have a lesser expectation of privacy than
other students. 12 1 In response to the contention that athletes have a
lesser expectation of privacy than students who participate in nonathletic extracurricular activities, the Supreme Court curtly noted this
distinction was not critical to their holding, as it was not essential to
the decision in Vernonia.122
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, 12 3 challenged the characterization of extracurricular activities, contending that voluntary participation in athletics "has a distinctly different dimension" than
1 24
voluntary participation in non-athletic extracurricular activities.
The dissent argued that students subject themselves to the requirement
of non-athletic extracurricular activities in order "to take full advantage
of the education offered them."' 125 In stark contrast, due to the competitive nature of athletics, schools must regulate athletics in an attempt
to mitigate the physical risks imposed to students. 1 26 Moreover, athletics require health and safety regulations while non-athletic extracurric127
ular activities such as band, choir and academic team do not.
The majority then considered the character of the intrusion
imposed by the Policy. 128 In line with other courts that had previously
119. Id. at 2565, n. 3. Justice Thomas wrote, "[tihis hefty weight on the side of the
school's balance [in Vernonia] applies with similar force in this case even though we
undertake a separate balancing with regard to this particular program."
120. Id. at 2566.
121. Id. at 2565. The Court reasoned that students who participate in
extracurricular activities could be compared to adults who choose to participate in
closely regulated industry. In both cases, there are intrusions upon "normal rights
and privileges, including privacy."
122. Id. The decision in Vernonia, according to the Court, "depended primarily
upon the school's custodial responsibility and authority."
123. Id. at 2571. Those joining Justice Ginsburg in her dissent included Justices
Stevens, O'Connor and Souter.
124. Id. at 2573.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2567
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ruled on the issue, the majority looked at the process of collecting the
urine sample itself, exactly what was detected in the urine, the confidentiality of the tests, and the consequences.129 The majority concluded that "given the minimally intrusive nature of the sample
collection and the limited uses to which the test results are put, we
' 130
conclude that the invasion of students' privacy is not significant."
In balancing the interrelated third interest-the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in
meeting them-the majority tipped the scales in favor of the interests of
the school district. 13 1 The majority rejected the argument that there
was no evidence offered by the school district of a real and immediate
interest of a drug problem to justify the policy. 132 The majority
pointed to evidence of the increasing drug problem across the nation
and the concerns this poses to the school district. 1 33 Furthermore, the
majority reiterated their view that "[a] demonstrated problem of drug
abuse. . . [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of the testing
regime," but some showing does "shore up an assertion of special need
for a suspicionless general search program."'1 34 Thus, the school district's evidence of teachers observing students who "appeared" to be
on drugs, the phone calls to the school board concerning the drug
problem and the few instances of drug paraphernalia in the school was
sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate response. 135 In reaffirming the Court's proposition that school districts will not have to
"prove" a demonstrable drug abuse problem in its schools, Justice
Thomas wrote, "it would make little sense to require a school district to
wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs
before it was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to
1 36
deter drug use."
The dissent argued the Tecumseh school district did not show sufficient evidence of a severe drug problem to warrant the adoption of
the Policy. 137 The dissent asserted that evidence of a severe drug prob129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 2566.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134. Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2568. The Supreme Court also rejected establishing a threshold test of
drug abuse that a school district would have to meet in order to establish a drug
testing policy.
137. Id. at 2575. Justice Ginsburg states that the drug abuse evidenced in Vernonia
"dwarfed" the evidence in Earls.
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lem must be demonstrated in order to tip the immediacy factor of the
balancing test in the school's favor. 13 8 Justice Ginsburg declared a
"showing" of a drug problem without any concrete evidence does not
1 39
warrant a suspicionless drug testing policy.

The majority concluded safety was not an essential element in the
special needs framework, rejecting the argument that testing of nonathletes was not required because there was no safety threat.' 40 The
majority concluded safety interests are furthered in testing all children,
athletes and non-athletes alike, "[wle know all too well that drug use
carries a variety of health risks for children..
,"141
The dissent
ardently challenges the majority's conclusions, accusing the majority
14 2
of essentially cutting a major element out of the Vernonia decision.
Relying on the decisions in Chandler as well as Vernonia, the dissent
declared special risks such as safety are necessary in order to implement a suspicionless drug testing policy. 1 43 If extracurricular activi-

ties do not pose safety risks, then a drug policy tailored to test
students to avoid safety hazards is not tailored at all. 1 44 Justice Ginsburg eloquently illustrates:
Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas in the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students the School District seeks to test in
truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual degree. There is a difference between imperfect tailoring and no
tailoring at all.' 4 5
Finally, the majority held the testing of students who participate
in non-athletic extracurricular activities was an effective means of
addressing the drug problem in the Tecumseh School District. 1 46 However, the majority acknowledged the facts of Vernonia provided a better
"fit" in terms of addressing the drug problem. 1 47 The majority found
this was not essential to the holding of the case. The majority's main
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2576.

141. Id. at 2568
142. Id. at 2567.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2566.
145. Id. at 2576-77.
146. Id. at 2569.
147. Id. Justice Thomas conceded that the drug problem in Vernonia was fueled by
the student athletes, role models in the town, and thus provided more justification for
the testing policy in Vernonia.
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concern was the fact that the program in Tecumseh was adopted in
14 8
regards to the school's custodial responsibilities.
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion took the majority's opinion
one step further. Justice Breyer believed the Policy in the Tecumseh
school district was constitutional because school systems must find a
way for students to be safe in schools. 1 49 With a shift in the educational system from teaching the fundamentals to "shoulder[ing] the
burden of feeding students breakfast and lunch, offering before and
after school child care services, and provid[ing] medical and psychological services," it is essential schools be safe and provide encourag150
ing learning environments.
The dissent contended the Vernonia school district had "two good
reasons to drug test athletes: sports team members were faced with
health risks and they 'were the leaders of the drug culture.' "151 The
Tecumseh school district did not have such reasonable justification to
target students who participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities. 152 The dissent argues the case at hand presents a very different
factual scenario than Vernonia and does not present enough evidence
to invoke the special needs exception. 1 53 Justice Ginsburg cautions a
broad reading of Vernonia, without giving weight to the specific factual
situation would open to the door to allow drug testing of every student
1 54
as a condition to attending public school.
VII.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

Earls for School Districts and Students

Slowly but surely, the Supreme Court is equipping school districts with bigger and better knives to carve away at students' Fourth
Amendment rights. School boards are ready and willing to carve. In
affirming the school district's right to conduct random, suspicionless
drug tests on students who participate in competitive extracurricular
activities as well as athletes, the Supreme Court has left in its wake a
plethora of unanswered questions. What is the difference between a
148. Id. at 2569.
149. Id. at 2570.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2577. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649)
152. Id. Justice Ginsburg, in support of the dissent's argument, stated that the
holding in Chandler supports this notion as the Court held that drug testing for
candidates for office were incompatible with the Fourth Amendment because the
program was "not well designed to identify candidates who violate anti-drug laws."
153. Id. at 2577-78.
154. Id. at 2572-73. Justice Ginsburg writes, "[miany children, like many adults,
engage in dangerous activities in their own time; that children are enrolled in school
scarcely allows government to monitor all such activities."
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competitive and noncompetitive extracurricular activity? How much
evidence of a drug problem is needed before a school may implement a
random, suspicionless policy? Can a school district require students
who participate in activities for academic credit to consent to testing?
If so, what are the ramifications for students who do not consent? Do
they lose academic credit? Are they banned from participating in the
class at all? Can a drug testing policy be implemented for students
who drive to school? Go on a field trip? How far can a school district
expand the holding in Earls? While the Supreme Court's decision
answers the question struggled with by courts, the decision does not
leave lower courts with guidance in implementing the three-factor balancing test.
The dissent and the Tenth Circuit were correct in their predictions-the Supreme Court opened the door for school districts to
implement random, suspicionless drug testing for every student in the
district without Fourth Amendment implications. First of all, the Earls
decision strayed from major elements that weighed heavily in the
Vernonia decision. Vernonia rested on a well-developed record that
demonstrated a very serious drug culture headed by the student athletes. Earls rested on a poorly developed record that did not exhibit a
serious drug culture in the school at all, much less headed by the students who participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities. The
majority overlooked this very distinct aberration in the records and
concluded that a school system only needs to produce evidence of
"some" drug abuse problem in the school system in order to invoke the
special needs exception. Where do we draw the line between a bona
fide drug problem and a potential drug problem? If the bar is so low
that school district only needs to target a select group of students,
show some drug abuse problem in the school, and not have to show
that the students in the targeted group are the drug users, then the
potential exists that school districts will be able to test all students
who walk through its doors.
Where did the safety concerns of Vernonia disappear in the Earls
decision? The Supreme Court in Vernonia focused its opinion on the
safety concerns that drugs play in athleticsl15-a valid concern. The
Earls Court concluded that safety interests are furthered in testing all
children.1 5 6 The dissent attacked this rationale saying that a major
15 7
portion of the Vernonia decision had been taken out of the decision.
They were correct. Safety concerns should be essential in order to
155. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).
156. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568.
157. Id. at 2567.
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implement a drug testing policy. A "high" academic team member
could hardly be said to pose a safety risk to the other team members
outside of the normal accidents that may occur even if the student was
not "high."
The Supreme Court has held random, suspicionless drug testing
policies constitutional in the context of railway jobs and custom officials who must carry firearms or handle classified materials.'i 8 However, these cases may easily be distinguishable from the public school
context case because in each of these cases the government's compelling concern involved safety. 15 9 Operating a train, as well as carrying
firearms under the influence of illegal drugs, could have devastating
effects on a significant number of people. It is the effect on other people that justifies the government's interests. It hardly can be said that a
band member, academic team member or Future Farmers of America
member who is under the influence of illegal drugs would pose a great
safety risk for anyone, even herself. In the public school context, illegal drug use can hardly be justified using the "safety" rationale the
Supreme Court has posited.
The majority's rejection of the Tenth Circuit's holding that school
districts must demonstrate a valid drug problem simply opens the
door wider for all students to be tested. More and more groups of students will be subjected to testing without safety concerns being present
and despite whether an activity is classified as voluntary or not as justification for the policy. For example, students who choose to drive to
school do so voluntarily; moreover, they choose to be regulated by
standards more stringent than the regular student population in terms
of parking and permits. From the majority's rationale it logically
would follow that if the school district shows there is some type of
drug problem in the school (even though that drug use may be minimal and not be rampant in students who drive to school), the district
may implement a suspicionless drug testing policy for students who
choose to drive on school premises. The reasoning could just as easily
be applied to students who want to attend field trips. Crafty administrators will eventually find a way to include all students in some type
of voluntary, regulated group, just as they found a way to include students who participate in extracurricular activities and athletics.
158. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
159. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-72; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21. In each of these
cases, the Court concluded that the governmental interest of safety for those who
operate trains and operate firearms in connection with their profession were
compelling.
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The potential for creating drug testing for all students is further
evidenced in the Supreme Court's assertion that the balancing scales
are always weighed in favor of the school system and its custodial
responsibility. Students who are concerned about their Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures come
into the legal arena with one strike against them. As the cases mentioned above indicate, courts are more than willing to concede the second factor of the balancing test-the character of the intrusion-is
negligible when the urine samples are collected in a regular bathroom
setting, the results are confidential and the consequences are not punitive. Thus, students have only the first factor of the Vernonia balancing
test to hang their Fourth Amendment rights upon-the nature of the
intrusion on their privacy. If the student voluntarily undertakes an
activity that is regulated in any manner, the student has a lesser expectation of privacy than other members of the student body who do not
voluntarily engage in extracurricular activities. The scales are weighed
against the students as soon as they enter the legal arena to plead for
the protection of their Fourth Amendment rights. For students in
extracurricular activities, their pleas fell on the deaf ears of the majority of the Supreme Court who refused to recognize that students who
participate in extracurricular activities have a greater expectation of
privacy than athletes. As the rationale of the Court stands today, the
plea of any students who voluntarily choose to participate in a regulated school activity will fall on deaf ears as well.
Not only are student's Fourth Amendment rights being affected
but also suspicionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities will affect the students themselves. From a public policy standpoint, the Supreme Court is sending a negative message to public
school students across the nation. Students are guilty until their urine
proves them innocent, even if they have never taken drugs. These students have a valid reason to be offended-they are implicated simply
because of their choice to make themselves more well-rounded individuals. Isn't this what education is all about? Moreover, students who
are concerned about their Fourth Amendment rights are essentially
being forced to make a choice between being subjected to drug testing
in order to participate in extracurricular activities, an integral part of
the educational system, or not participating at all. In a generation
where institutions of higher learning look not only to academics but
also to involvement, that is a tough pill to swallow for students who are
abreast of their right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
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Students who participate in extracurricular activities are less
likely to abuse drugs than students who are not. By implementing random, suspicionless drug testing policies for students who participate
in extracurricular activities, school districts are simply targeting the
wrong class of students. While an argument could made that drug
testing does deter kids from doing drugs because they know they will
get caught, these targeted students are simply not the students who are
likely to use drugs. Furthermore, the deterrence of drug use does not
and should not outweigh a student's privacy interests-a student's
right to privacy of their bodies and the fluids they contain should not
be outweighed absent some heightened safety concern for all children
within the school.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It cannot be denied, students in public schools have Fourth
Amendment guarantees." 6

After the decision in Earls, it is unclear

exactly what those guarantees entail and how long they are going to
last. The holding in Earls answered lingering questions that existed in

lower courts as to whether students who participate in non-athletic
extracurricular activities have a lesser expectation of privacy. How-

ever, lurking in the halls of high schools everywhere are groups of students who are potential targets of a suspicionless drug testing regime.
Earls will likely not be the last word in the drug testing debate in public schools. In the meantime, school districts may make specimen cups

as much a part of the high-school experience for those who
participate
6
in competitive extracurricular activities as prom night.1 '

Caroline Slater Burnette

160. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
161. Walter Shapiro, Student PrivacyJust a Specimen for Profit, Politics, USA TODAY,
July 27, 2002 at 4A.
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